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The Future of Global Development
Assume Joe Biden wins the US presidential elections this year. Once Biden is in office, how would you expect the potential for conflict between China and the United States to change from its current state?
Trump's relationship with China can be seen by his strong tariff program against China. This can be evident through, his cancellation associated with Chinese student visas, as well as his negotiations for parity in trade. Joe Biden, on the other hand, owes big debts in the direction of China (Kim & Kim, 2019).
Joe Biden is the presidential candidate standing against Mr. Trump in Elections that is to be held in November this year. The current narrative set by Mr. Trump against China is the one which will define the new course in the world- order in a time that is associated with the Post-COVID scenario. If one analyzes the statements by the leaders associated with both the parties be it Republican or Democratic, the words are bitter when it comes in the direction of China. There might be differences when it comes again in the direction of ideology as well as issues that are different, but China has a common point associated with consensus in between both parties. In the same way, if this hypothetical situation will become a reality that Joe Biden wins Presidential Elections, one cannot expect to see any change in the stance associated with future Political Leadership associated with The US. Here it is necessary to understand that, as the sentiments associated with citizens of The US are very much against China. This type of sentiment will define the discourse associated with future Political Leadership with the US (Zhao, 2017).
However, Joe Biden would be the most adequate choice for the Chinese. Trump has made the media his own as well as has absolute control over public opinion, yet, even though most negativity is associated with the time, he has always mended his way at critical times. If in the opinion of the public it feels that the Chinese leadership would not make an error in the direction of betting on Joe Biden. This man, who also has a piece of baggage associated with Obama's measure is associated with the missing answers (Ljunggren, 2020).
When it comes to the direction of Joe Biden's election associated with a lifetime, there are no easy answers for China. The former U.S. Vice President does not share Donald Trump's enthusiasm for an all-out trade war with Beijing, yet remains committed in the direction of a signature hard line on Xinjiang, Hong Kong, as well as Taiwan. Biden has pressed in the direction of reviving American leadership at the global level but has been exceedingly reluctant of disproving Trump's "Made in China" allegations. He surrounds himself with a pool associated with advisers who endorse getting tough on Beijing but also admit the pitfalls in Washington's national performance. Despite the uncertainties, Biden's emphasis on multilateralism, with a better foreign policy articulation, as well as the demonstration of statecraft ensures his China policy stands different from the ones associated with his rival (Allison, 2017).
A major part associated with Biden's foreign policy vision is in the direction of rebuilding America's long-standing alliances as well as steer them toward cooperation. But, on the other hand, that is associated with coercion. His team will attempt in the direction of reviving the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA)as well as salvage Washington's credibility in a fragile NATO alliance. Biden's fixation with U.S. "power projection" also limits the space for coercive rhetoric at key decision-making seats, such as the United Nations Security Council as well as the World Health Organization (WHO).
His goal is in the direction of recommitting to the Paris Agreement creates space for broad-based consensus-building, driven by the belief that environmental justice transcends political persuasions. Even on the challenges associated with tackling future disease outbreaks, Biden has forced America in the direction of reckoning with its rapid response deficiencies as well as focus toward inward scrutiny. This is a welcome shift from his Republican counterpart, who continues in the direction of attributing America's COVID-19 leadership failures toward foreign mythology (Liao, 2016).
It is against this backdrop that Biden's multilateral worldview runs parallel in the direction of Beijing's demonstrated pursuit for global cooperation. They are affording new openings for foreign policy convergence. For instance, on JCPOA, China joined a range, associated with Western allies in the direction of reaffirming its commitment toward the nuclear pact. It is based on its contribution toward global nuclear non-proliferation architecture. That is a strategic rationale repeatedly backed by Biden as well as his allies. Similarly, an American re-entry into the WHO would put the brakes on Sino-U.S. divergence. It is, under a given condition on the ways U.S. obstructionism as well as financial strong-arming became the basis for American departure. On climate, Beijing represents a significant conversation that can complement Biden's push toward net-zero emissions by 2050. Some are associated with China's top state energy producers who are the first in Asia in the direction of making those targets official.
Also, America's shambolic COVID-19 handling has made clear the value associated with research as well as developing partnerships with China. Washington's steady reduction associated with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) personnel in Beijing illustrates the difficulties faced by Washington in tackling the virus without pandemic-time cooperation. Biden would assume office with a point in the direction of proving himself to America's scientific community, where enthusiasm for U.S.-China escalations is scarce.
However, a Biden presidency also sustains some fact that is associated with America's hard-line policy positions: refusal in the direction of reading Hong Kong as well as Taiwan as Beijing's internal matter. It mobilizes support for a toxic Xinjiang narrative, as well as activating party consensus on South China Sea interference. Unlike Trump, Biden is also better positioned in the direction of selling America's anti-Huawei pitch to global allies. Yet, assessing the Biden challenge on known policies is in the direction of missing the point somehow. The key intensifier in Sino-U.S. relations has been inadequate communication. Trump's absolute aversion is in the direction of constructive dialogue with Beijing has allowed the U.S. hostilities to amplify in isolation. A Biden victory offers an opportunity in the direction of transforming some dynamics. Biden's official track-record is informed by a degree associated with foreign policy statecraft, as well as he recognizes the value associated with constructive dialogue in diffusing tensions, even if it is tactical. Above all, the former vice president will find it increasingly difficult in the direction of measuring Sino-U.S. progress based on confrontational metrics introduced as well as practiced by Trump.
To illustrate this dilemma, consider Biden's recent threat in the direction of "sanctioning Chinese officials" over Tibet. On the one hand, Biden test-drives coercion to appear tough on Trump. But as president, he must decide if issuing ultimatums to China will earn credit with global partners, or temper the blowback associated with Trump's "America First" agenda. For China, the reality is much simpler: If Biden is truly determined in the direction of reconciling with Beijing, nothing should stop him from coming to the negotiating table (Schindler, Jepson & Cui, 2020).
So, relations between The US and China will continue in the direction of deteriorating but to what level this is hard to predict. On the other hand, the possible change or a complete turnaround per se is not possible.
Reference for International Political Analysis
Allison, G. (2017). Destined for war: Can America and China escape Thucydides's trap?. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
Liao, R. (2016). Dysfunction, Incentives, and Trade: Rehabilitating US-China Cyber Relations. Geo. J. Int'l Aff., 17, 38.
Ljunggren, B. (2020). From Obama to Trump, and beyond: Washington’s painful search for a credible China policy. In The United States in the Indo-Pacific. Manchester University Press.
Schindler, S., Jepson, N., & Cui, W. (2020). Covid-19, China and the future of global development. Research in Globalization, 2, 100020.
Zhao, S. (2017). American reflections on the engagement with China and responses to President Xi’s New Model of Major Power Relations. Journal of Contemporary China, 26(106), 489-503.
Kim, A., & Kim, P. (2019, October). Estimation of the 2020 US Presidential Election Competition and Election Stratagies. In 2019 IEEE 10th Annual Ubiquitous Computing, Electronics & Mobile Communication Conference (UEMCON) (pp. 1046-1050). IEEE.
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